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The Demographic Imperative in Religious
Change in the United States1
Michael Hout
University of California, Berkeley
Andrew Greeley
University of Chicago and University of Arizona
Melissa J. Wilde
University of California, Berkeley

U.S. Protestants are less likely to belong to “mainline” denominations
and more likely to belong to “conservative” ones than used to be
the case. Evidence from the General Social Survey indicates that
higher fertility and earlier childbearing among women from conservative denominations explains 76% of the observed trend for
cohorts born between 1903 and 1973: conservative denominations
have grown their own. Mainline decline would have slowed in recent
cohorts, but a drop-off in conversions from conservative to mainline
denominations prolonged the decline. A recent rise in apostasy added
a few percentage points to mainline decline. Conversions from mainline to conservative denominations have not changed, so they played
no role in the restructuring.
INTRODUCTION

The decline of the “mainline” religious denominations and concomitant
growth of more conservative denominations and sects has been among
the major U.S. religious trends of the past 60 years or so. The mainline
denominations—principally the Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, and
Episcopalian churches—attracted over 60% of Protestants in the 1950s
1
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and were a majority among Protestants as recently as 1972. In the 1990s,
only about 40% of U.S. Protestants were affiliated with mainline churches
(Wuthnow 1988; Woodberry and Smith 1998). The conservative denominations—including the Southern Baptist Convention, the Assemblies of
God, the Pentecostal and Holiness churches, and some rather small
sects—account for the remainder of Protestants who are not in the mainline denominations. They have grown both in absolute numbers and as
a share of the Protestant population over this time, so the redistribution
of Protestants is as much a story about how these denominations are
growing as it is about how mainline denominations are declining. Even
though the fraction of American adults who identify themselves as Protestant has decreased from 63% in the early 1970s to 54% in the late 1990s,
population growth has offset the decrease enough that the total number
of Protestants increased over time.
Social scientists, religious scholars, and journalists have offered several
explanations of this major trend. Nearly everyone who has addressed the
subject (Hadden 1969; Kelley 1972; Hunter 1987; Wuthnow 1989; Neuhaus 1992; Reeves 1998) has begun with what must seem like a commonsense question: Why would mainline Protestants be leaving their congregations and switching to conservative denominations? Their
explanations take many forms, but all of these observers discuss the propensity to switch from a mainline denomination to a conservative one as
if it is the prime or only change contributing to mainline decline.2
Direct conversion from mainline to conservative denominations is but
one of five possible ways that the proportion of Protestants in mainline
denominations could decline over time. The other four possible sources
of mainline decline are (1) natural increase (perhaps conservative women
have more children than mainline women), (2) switching from conservative to mainline denominations (perhaps conservatives switch to mainline denominations less often than they used to), (3) apostasy (perhaps
persons from mainline denominations are leaving Protestantism faster
than conservatives are), or (4) inflow (perhaps the number of people from
outside Protestantism who join conservative denominations exceeds the
number joining mainline denominations).3 The more differential natural
increase, decreasing switching from conservative to mainline denomina2

The leading explanations differ in approach, emphasis, and what they specify as the
cause of mainline decline and conservative growth, but they all focus on switching
from mainline to conservative denominations as the dynamic producing denominational change. Smith (1992) is the sole dissenting voice.
3
Observing that one is occurring does not rule out the prospect that the others are
happening, too. The analytic task of this article is to assess the relative contribution
of each possible source (including mainline-to-conservative switching) to the observed
trend.
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tions, or apostasy among mainline Protestants contribute to religious
change, the less relevant the leading explanations are for understanding
the causes of this historic realignment. Demographic tools allow us to
assess the contribution of each potential source of change to observed
trends. As we go about applying them, our task is not to adjudicate among
the leading explanations but to assess the relevance of any of them. To
date, only two studies seriously consider the alternatives to mainline-toconservative conversion, and they disagree with one another.4
We will show that an advantage in the rate of natural increase—a
combination of higher birth rates and earlier childbearing among conservative women—explains over three-fourths of the observed change in
Protestants’ denominational affiliations for cohorts born between 1900
and 1970. Most of the rest of the observed change is caused by falling
rates of switching from conservative to mainline denominations; differential apostasy plays a small but significant role. Remarkably, because it
has not increased over the past 50 years or so, switching from mainline
to conservative denominations—the focus of the leading explanations—explains none of the decline of mainline denominations.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC IMPERATIVE

The demographic imperative states that, in a population made up of two
groups, the one with the higher rate of natural increase will increase its
share of the total at the expense of the group with the lower rate of natural
increase, all else being equal (e.g., Coale 1972; Kennedy 1973; Preston
1974). When applied to the Protestant population, the demographic imperative implies that, over time, the conservative denominations will gain
(if it turns out that they have higher fertility), even if no one switches
from one kind of Protestant denomination to the other. The “all else being
equal” stipulation means that denominations with higher fertility will gain
unless their natural advantage is offset by switching to low-fertility denominations or by more exits from Protestantism on the part of people
raised in high-fertility denominations. There is no evidence in the literature or in the data to be presented in this article that either of these
offsetting possibilities has been significant in the case of conservative and
mainline Protestants.5 So it seems very reasonable to apply the demo4

Roof and McKinney (1987) share our emphasis on the demographic sources of change;
Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens (1994) emphasize greater apostasy among those with
mainline origins.
5
Indeed, to the extent to which the question has come up before, the supposition is
that all three factors—natural increase, conversion, and apostasy—all work to the
advantage of conservative denominations.

PROOF 3

American Journal of Sociology
graphic imperative to understanding mainline decline (and the complementary increase of conservative denominations) if it can be demonstrated
that conservative denominations do in fact have the higher rate of natural
increase.
Is there any reason to expect more natural increase within the conservative denominations than in the mainline denominations? The demographic literature rarely if ever mentioned the subject before 1987. Studies
comparing Protestants and Catholics are common and some studies of
single denominations exist, but our search failed to turn up earlier studies
that compare the fertility of Protestant denominations. The history of
family planning and birth control advocacy suggests that there might be
higher fertility among women in conservative denominations. Women and
clergy from mainline Protestant denominations were prominent in the
movements to promote family planning and repeal bans on birth control
devices in the United States; conservative Protestants and Catholics opposed these actions (Campbell 1960). Extrapolating from the actions of
public figures to the private choices of millions of people is fraught with
uncertainty, but if the two are commensurate, it would imply that mainline
Protestant women adopted birth control and family limitation practices
sooner than other Protestant women did.
Westoff and Ryder (1977) and other classic sources contain information
about the gap between Protestants (taken altogether) and Catholics but
give no details about Protestant denominations. Roof and McKinney
(1987, p. 161) provide the first relevant evidence. They show that for
white women born before 1935 the cohort fertility of conservative Protestant women was 17% higher than that of women from moderate denominations and 37% higher than that of women from liberal denominations.6 Mosher, Williams, and Johnson (1992) report more recent data
for Fundamentalist Protestant women 15–44 years old in the 1980s. They
show a difference of one-fifth child between the total fertility rate for these
women from conservative denominations and that for other Protestant
women. The difference between Roof and McKinney’s estimate and that
of Mosher et al. suggests that the difference might be waning. Our task
is to extend the time series back in time as far as the GSS can take us
and to make reasonable estimates of what the difference between women
from conservative and mainline denominations might have been in earlier
cohorts.
We present the details below, but we will show that, among cohorts
born early in the 20th century, women from conservative denominations
had, on average, nearly one more birth than women from mainline de6

Our study builds on theirs in that we share the same data source—the General Social
Survey. By the time we undertook this work 14 more years of data had accumulated.
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nominations. That gap narrowed until the baby boom reached its peak.
Then mainline women born in the early 1940s reduced their fertility while
the women in conservative denominations continued at the higher rates
for another five years. Among recent cohorts with completed fertility,
women from conservative denominations had only slightly higher fertility
than those from mainline denominations.7 For cohorts still in the process
of bearing children, conservative women have had more, but mainline
women expect more in the future.
We are not the first to introduce fertility into the discussion of mainline
decline. Hoge and Roozen (1979) noted the connection between birth rates
and religious participation. But they emphasized the nationwide trend
toward smaller families and its effect on the age composition of the Protestant population, not differences between the fertility of women in mainline and conservative denominations.8 As we noted, Roof and McKinney
(1987) presented data for three types of denominations, and they did link
the conservative denominations’ higher rates to the changing composition
within Protestantism. Perrin, Kennedy, and Miller (1997) present a sophisticated argument that parallels ours, but their focus is on new evangelical movements not on the full span of conservative denominations
and sects.9 Bibby and Brinkerhoff (1994) attribute the growth of conservative churches in Canada to higher contemporary fertility. However,
their emphasis is on the nature of conversion and the “circulation of saints”
from one conservative denomination to another; they do not fully develop
the implications of differential fertility (although they assume its effects
would be substantial if they were to work out the details). Some others
(e.g., Wuthnow 1993, p. 142) note the possible demographic advantage
that high fertility might give some denominations (citing Roof and McKinney 1987). Neither Roof and McKinney nor Wuthnow quantified the
contribution of demography to mainline decline although Roof and McKinney hazard the guess that fertility is more important than conversion

7

The differentials in the GSS data on recent cohorts are commensurate with the
estimates in Mosher et al. (1992).
8
Hoge and Roozen (1979) did note that higher fertility within conservative denominations would imply higher growth rates for them than for the mainline denominations,
but they presented no evidence of differential fertility by denomination. Nor did they
work through the details of how large differentials would have to be in order to be a
significant source of denominational change.
9
Perrin et al. (1997, p. 75) include the statement “previous research has suggested that
much of the conservative success can be attributed to high birth rates (Hoge and
Roozen 1979; Roof and McKinney 1987).” This is a surprising conclusion unless one
puts a lot of emphasis on the word “suggested.” As we shall show, the conclusion is
right, but Hoge and Roozen (1979) do not even show evidence of differential fertility
and Roof and McKinney (1987) do not present a full decomposition of change.
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when they show that rates of switching between Protestant denominations
had not changed as of 1987.

PLAN OF THE ANALYSIS

Our strategy is to develop a demographic simulation model that combines
observations on religious origins, current religion, and fertility (both the
amount and timing of it) to predict the proportion of Protestants in mainline and conservative denominations for each cohort born between 1900
and 1973. We then make counterfactual predictions in order to isolate the
contributions of fertility and denominational switching. The second scenario supposes that switching does not occur; differentials in fertility are
the only source of change in the distribution of Protestants into mainline
and conservative denominations under this scenario. The third scenario
removes fertility differences and uses observed switching from mainline
to conservative denominations to project the denominational distribution
of Protestants: We then consider conservative-to-mainline switching as an
isolated factor. Finally we combine the two types of intra-Protestant
switching with non-Protestant to mainline or conservative conversions
and mainline or conservative apostasy to assess the joint contribution of
all forms of switching, conversion, and apostasy.

MODELS FOR THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE PROTESTANT
POPULATION

We adapt a model of population growth to the current purpose of studying
religious identification. It was originally developed by Joshua R. Goldstein
to study the similar process of identification with ancestry groups (Hout
and Goldstein 1994). From an initial population of persons born in year
t and raised in denomination j, Pjt, we can project the next generation’s
population if we know the intrinsic rate of natural increase, rjt , how many
people joined denomination j as adults, Cjt, how many people left j, Ajt,
and the length of a generation, Tt:
Pj,t⫹Tjt p Pjt exp (rjt ) ⫹ Cjt ⫺ Ajt ,

(1)

where j p 1 for mainline denominations, j p 2 for conservative denominations, and t ranges from 1900 to 1973. The proportion of the population
that is mainline—that is, mt p P1t /(P1t ⫹ P2t), will decline over time if
r1t ! r2t , or C1t ! C2t , or A1t 1 A2t.
The intrinsic rate of natural increase, rjt , for denomination j and cohort
t, is the balance between the fertility and mortality among the women of
PROOF 6

Religious Change
denomination j who were born in year t and whose fertility produces the
next generation (cohort t ⫹ Tjt):
rjt p ln (fjt l Tjtt pf )/Tjt ,

(2)

where fjt is the number of births per woman among the women of denomination j and cohort t; l Tt is the probability that a woman lives to
age Tjt if she was born in year t, and pf is the proportion of babies who
are girls (.49).10 The model takes observed fertility and mortality as inputs
and yields a prediction about the denominational composition of baseline
cohort. It then takes that prediction and makes a prediction about the
next cohort, and so on, recursively.

DATA SOURCES AND MEASURES

To apply our model to religious change we need data on peoples’ current
religious affiliations, their religious origins, fertility, and mortality. We use
the General Social Survey (GSS) of 1974–98 as our main data source. The
GSS is consistently administered and as a result offers a 24-year time
series of comparable data.11 A nationally representative sample survey, it
has been fielded in most years since 1972 (always in the late winter and
early spring of the year; i.e., all interviews are completed after Christmas
and nearly all are done before Easter). Since 1973 full probability methods
have been used to draw a sample that gives every English-speaking American adult an equal probability of being interviewed, supplemented by
oversamples of African-Americans in 1982 and 1987 (Davis, Smith, and
Marsden 1999). We use linearized variance estimation techniques (Eltinge
and Sribney 1996) to correct for the inefficiency of the GSS design relative
to a simple random sample (i.e., “design effects”). We also use vital statistics data for some of the fertility data (Heuser 1976) and for the all of
the mortality data.12

10

Under the model as it is written here, fertility differs by denomination and cohort,
mortality differs by cohort but not by denomination, and the proportion of babies that
are girls is a constant. Therefore, all differences between denominations reflect differential fertility (through both the number of births per woman, fjt, and the length
of a generation, Tjt). Mortality differentials might well be important in the real world.
We quite simply lack the data to assess them, so we make the necessary assumption
that the conservative and mainline women had identical mortality at each age.
11
For 1972 and 1973 the GSS does not contain data on denominational origins; without
that information we cannot assess conversion and apostasy.
12
For more information on John Wilmoth’s data, see the Berkeley Mortality Files
2000, at http://demog.berkeley.edu. Follow the links through “research” and then
“Berkeley Mortality Database.”

PROOF 7

American Journal of Sociology
Classifying Denominations
From its inception, the GSS has obtained data about Protestants’ denominational affiliations. The first 10 surveys used a then-standard enumeration of major Protestant denominations and an “other, specify” catch-all
category that grew over time. In 1974 a comparable question on religious
origins was added. Since 1983 far more detail on current and original
denomination has been collected (the interview schedule lists 25 specific
denominations for the interviewers to consult when asking the question
but instructs them to get more details). The data file includes codes for
the 25 denominations on the interviewers’ list plus 114 denominations
and sects identified in the “other specify” answers for a total of 139 Protestant organizations. Tom W. Smith (1990) developed a trichotomy to
reduce the complexity of this very detailed categorization by grouping
together those denominations that emphasize the “fundamentals” of the
Christian religion as the early fundamentalists saw it, including the literal
truth of the Bible, personal conversion (known as being “born again”),
and reaching out to convert others to Christianity. We take his “fundamentalist” category as our “conservative” one; we use the “moderate,”
“liberal,” and “not classified” denominations in his trichotomy to be the
“mainline” category.13 Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Methodists, and most
Lutherans make up the bulk of the mainline category while Baptists,
Pentecostals, and members of the Church of Christ and Assemblies of
God are the largest conservative denominations (Smith 1990).
Age Restrictions
Because of its accumulated size and duration, the GSS makes possible
analyses which compare the cohorts born in the first three-fourths of the
20th century. We drop the people under 25 from the analysis because
peoples’ religious affiliations are in flux up to their late twenties or later
(Fumanti 1997). This entails assuming that people do not change their
denominational type after a certain age. We experimented with both 25
and 35 years old as the younger cut-off. We found that including persons
25–34 years old changes the end of the time series substantially. In the
late 1990s, 25–34-year-old Protestants are more likely than 35–44-yearold Protestants to be in conservative denominations. This shows up in
the cohort time series we report as a sharp acceleration toward the conservative denominations in cohorts born since 1960. This may misstate
the ultimate distribution of the post-1960s cohorts. In all cohorts for which
13

We acknowledge Woodberry and Smith’s (1998) comments about the difficulty of
labeling the “nonmainline” segment of U.S. Protestant denominations. We follow their
use here and adopt “conservative” in the broad, doctrinal sense of the word.
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we have data, 25–34 year olds raised in mainline denominations are more
likely than the 25–34 year olds raised in conservative denominations to
report “no religion” as their current preference. If the young apostates
from the post-1960s cohorts subsequently return to the denomination they
were raised in, then future observations on the post-1960 cohorts might
reveal them to have more of a mainline representation than their current
religious preferences suggest.
Differential mortality may bias comparisons across cohorts if the cohorts are only observed at the oldest ages. That is, the persons who survive
to be interviewed at advanced age probably do not represent what the
denominational composition of their cohorts was before significant numbers died. In particular, we suspect that the lower socioeconomic status
and concentration in the South and in rural areas of other regions of the
conservative Protestant denominations might expose them to earlier mortality. To reduce our exposure to this bias, we exclude persons 75 years
of age and older from all analyses. We experimented with using 65 years
old as the cut-off. The results were very similar either way, so we chose
the longer time series.
Fertility and Mortality Data
We use two sources of fertility data: the GSS and birth registry data
compiled by Heuser (1976). Registered births are usually the preferred
source of fertility data, but they cannot be used alone here because the
forms used to gather vital statistics do not record the parents’ religion(s).
Recent surveys by the National Center for Health Statistics have included
details about religious denominations, but there is nothing before 1990
(Mosher et al. 1992). From its inception the GSS has asked women (and
men) about their fertility.14 We use these data to estimate the number
children ever born by women 45–69 years old for each combination of
cohort and denomination; that is women currently in either a mainline
or conservative Protestant denomination and born in each single year
between 1903 and 1953. We smooth the series with loess regressions with
a bandwidth of .2 (Cleveland 1994). The smoothed value for cohort t
becomes the f-value for the rate of natural increase that produced cohort
t ⫹ Tjt (e.g., if T1,1903 p 31, then f j,1903 contributes to the natural increase
that produces the 1934 cohort, rj,1934 ). It would be useful to have data on
14

Since 1974 the question has been, “How many children have you ever had? Please
count all that were born alive at any time (including any you had from a previous
marriage).” In 1972 and 1973 the portion in parentheses was omitted; in 1974 and
1975 interviews were instructed not to read the part in parentheses if the person had
already said that they had never been married. Since 1976 the only instruction has
been to ask everyone, regardless of age, sex, or marital status.

PROOF 9

American Journal of Sociology
the age-specific fertility rates; without it we must assume that each woman
has all her children at the average age, Tjt.
For the earlier cohorts we do not have data for denominations, so we
extrapolate the patterns in the GSS to estimate them. We use Heuser’s
(1976) published rates for all women and the formulas:
TFR1t p TFR t ⫺ dt ,

(3)

for mainline denominations and
TFR2t p TFR t ⫹

mt
d,
1 ⫺ mt t

(4)

for conservative denominations. Where t ( p 1875 to 1900) is cohort and
dt takes its observed value for 1900 and is linearly extrapolated toward
a zero value in 1850, and mt is the proportion of cohort t that is in a
mainline denomination.15 The mortality data are from vital statistics as
adjusted by John Wilmouth in the Berkeley morality files (see n. 12 above).
Our estimates of Protestant fertility by denominational type are in
figure 1. The children ever born (CEB) data confirm that women from
conservative denominations had higher fertility for most of the 20th century. In 52 of the 56 single-year cohorts, the point estimate of the CEB
for conservative women exceeds the CEB among mainline women. Some
of these estimates are based on few cases, but the effect is so large that
it shows up even though sampling variability is great.16 Smoothing the
data using loess regression makes the difference between the fertility of
women from mainline and conservative denominations clearer than the
noisy point estimates do. The difference between the smoothed estimates
starts out at more than one child for the first several cohorts, falls to onehalf of a child for the 1917 cohort, stays there until the 1925 cohort, falls
to .15 child for the cohort born in 1951 (the last year in the figure). The
other lines show the observed total fertility rate (TFR) for late-19th-century cohorts and our extrapolation of the differentials based on what we
observe in the 1900–1914 cohorts and the assumption that there was no
differential by religion in 1850. These fertility data are the key inputs to
15

This extrapolation assumes that the unobserved TFRt for all Protestants is the same
as the TFRt for all women. That assumption accords well with the observations for
the 1903–53 cohorts, but we cannot test it for the 1875–99 cohorts. With that assumption we can further state that TFRt p mtTFR1t ⫹ (1 ⫺ mt)TFR2t. Defining dt p
TFRt ⫺ TFR1t, we get the result in (4). We get dt for t p 1875 to 1899 by assuming
d1900 is correctly measured in the GSS, that d1850 p 0 , and that the rate of increase in
dt was constant from 1850 to 1900. We take m1850 p .8 as a starting value and derive
the rest of the mt series from the model.
16
The individual observations are based on between 12 and 362 cases, so sampling
fluctuations are a considerable source of year-to-year variation.
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Fig. 1.—Fertility (children ever born and total fertility rate) by denominational type: U.S.
Protestant women, 45–69 years old. Children-ever-born data are from the General Social
Survey, 1973–98; total fertility rates (TRF) are from Heuser (1974); CEB data are smoothed
using loess regression (bandwidth p .2). TFR data for each denomination were projected
from TFR for all women and the denominational differences observed in CEB data (see
text for details).

the model in equations (1) and (2), but we also need information on the
length of a generation, Tjt.
To calculate the length of a generation, Tjt , requires data on age-specific
fertility. We only know CEB, so we simulate Tjt using observations on
age at first marriage, a jt, and CEBjt, according to the formula: Tjt p
a jt ⫹ 1.5fjt where ajt is the mean age at marriage for women from denomination j and cohort t (estimated from the GSS for women 40–69
years old) and fjt p CEBjt.17
17

This formula assumes a constant birth interval of 1.5 years from marriage to first
birth, first birth to second, etc. This simplification could be a source of imprecision in
the demographic time series if birth intervals vary significantly as children accumulate
or between denominations or among cohorts. The accuracy of our demographic model
depends on this simplification: the greater the variation in any of these components
of our extrapolation, the more likely we are to misstate the contribution of natural
increase to mainline decline. Given that conservative Protestant women probably have
their children closer together and that women who have more children spread their
reproduction over a broader span of cohorts than women who bear few children do,
our projections almost certainly understate the contribution of fertility to mainline
decline.
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Graphical Displays and Data Smoothing
We use graphical displays to show the major trends in the data. Our
displays combine as much detail in the observed data as possible and
trend lines that smooth out sampling fluctuations. Two practices we use
are not standard. First, we take account of the GSS survey design. In
particular, as we mentioned already, we use linear variance estimators to
adjust for design effects specific to the variables we are analyzing (Eltinge
and Sribney 1996). These methods are a truer reflection of sampling error
than textbook methods that are based on simple random sample assumptions and superior to the use of average design effects that may
overstate or understate the impact of design on a given variable.18 We
also make extensive use of locally estimated—“loess”—regressions (Cleveland 1994). The degree to which the loess regression actually smooths the
observed data depends on a parameter set in advance of data fitting;
Cleveland refers to this parameter as the “bandwidth.” It is the proportion
of cases used to estimate each point on the loess curve. We experimented
with bandwidths of .2, .3, .5, and .6 for each series we present. “The goal
is to make [the bandwidth] as large as possible to make the curve as
smooth as possible, without distorting the underlying pattern of the data”
(Cleveland 1994, p. 172). Data with strong, monotonic trends like the
denominational data in figures 2 and 3 below are well described by lines
calculated with broad bandwidth (.5 or greater); trends with more
twists—for example, the children-ever-born data in figure 1 below, require
a narrower bandwidth (.2 or .3).

THE TREND IN PROTESTANT AFFILIATION

The first order of business is to quantify the extent of mainline decline
using the GSS. High-quality survey data of this sort are superior to denominational data for two reasons. First, counts from one denomination
are hard to compare with counts from others because the denominations
do not apply a common standard. Second, denominational data lack observations of individuals, making it impossible to separate lifelong mem18

For example, design effects are smaller than average for gender because men and
women are pretty evenly distributed across primary sampling units (PSUs) in the GSS,
but design effects are larger than average for denominational type because denominations are very unevenly distributed. The extreme case is that of Mormons who are
among the most highly clustered. Their numbers appear to decrease in the late 1990s
simply because a city in Utah rotated out of the sample and was replaced by another
city of the same size in another mountain state. Because Mormons were far more
prevalent in the Utah city than in the city outside Utah, the proportion Mormon in
the GSS fell after 1993 even though we have reason to believe that their numbers
actually grew.
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Fig. 2.—Proportion of Protestants professing a mainline denomination by year: U.S.
Protestants, 25–74 years old, 1973–98. Data are from the GSS, 1973–98, and were smoothed
using loess (bandwidth p .8). Vertical lines show 95% confidence interval for each observed
percentage. Estimates take account of sampling design.

bers from converts (and, among converts, it is impossible to distinguish
those who have come from denominations of the same type from those
who have crossed from one type to the other). Data from the GSS solve
both of these problems with denominational data.
The GSS data confirm a major shift in affiliation from mainline to
conservative denominations among U.S. Protestants.19 Annual data (circles) in figure 2 reveal more change than persistence in the percentage of
Protestants in mainline denominations. The trend line is monotonically
down-sloping, and the confidence intervals for the annual data overlap
that line in all but one year.20 From 1973 to 1998, mainline denominations
have lost about 10 percentage points of their relative share of 25–74-yearold Protestants—from 57% in 1973 to 47% in 1998—while conservative
denominations have, by definition, gained 10 percentage points—from
19

Smith (1990) used GSS data to call the decline of the mainline into question, but he
was interested in “fundamentalists” as a share of the total adult population. Changes
in the non-Protestant population compensated for the internal distribution of Protestants toward the conservative denominations, producing Smith’s result of no net “fundamentalist” gain.
20
We see higher than expected percentages in mainline denominations in 1982 and
1990. The vertical lines in the figure display the 95% confidence interval for each
percentage and indicate that the 1982 deviations from trend are not attributable to
sampling error unless our design-sensitive variance methods substantially underestimate it. The 1990 point is outside the standard error we would have obtained using
standard methods, but it is within the wider confidence interval obtained using the
linear variance estimator.
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43% to 53%.21 The likelihood ratio chi-square test (L2 p 156.73; df p
21) is statistically significant at conventional levels, rejecting the null hypothesis of no change, even without taking the order of the years into
account. Most of the decline occurred between 1978 and 1986 (with 1982
an aberration).
Denominations may perceive and report only those persons who show
up for services. If persons who identity with the mainline denominations
are less likely to attend services than conservatives are, then these data
may overstate the share of the churchgoing population that affiliates with
mainline denominations. If the association between denomination and
21

The 1973 data are in fig. 2 but not in subsequent analyses because the 1973 survey
lacked a question on religious origins.
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attendance does not vary over time, then the direction and size of the
trend for churchgoing Protestants will not differ from what figure 2 shows.
To find out, we repeated the calculations using only persons who attend
church services once a month or more (not shown). Mainline affiliation
among churchgoing Protestants is between six and eight percentage points
lower than in the total Protestant population in each year, but our estimate
of the trend is the same as in figure 2; that is a decline of 10 percentage
points for the mainline denominations between 1973 and 1998. For the
remainder of our analysis we use all Protestants as the population base.
We can extend the time series of denominational affiliation by measuring change across cohorts under the assumptions we discussed above
in our section on classifying denominations. Figure 3 shows the decline
of mainline Protestant denominations by single-year cohorts. Each data
point represents between 21 and 521 observations, so there is a lot of
sampling variability in the raw data, especially at the beginning and end
of the cohort time series where the cases thin out. The loess trend line
summarizes the important features of the observed data. We also add a
line representing a constant rate of change to help us detect any periods
of relatively slow or rapid change and error bars to reflect the sampling
error inherent in the single-year cohort data.
Extending the time series by using the cohort view allows us to see
more change than we could with the period view. If we are correct in
assuming that the distribution of Protestants into different denominational
types does not change after a cohort reaches 25 years of age, then this is
a more accurate assessment of change than the period view accords. The
cohort data indicate that mainline denominations lost 24 percentage points
and conservative denominations increased 24 points between the earliest
cohorts of the 20th century and those that reached 25 years of age most
recently. Change occurred in two periods: among cohorts born from 1900
to 1944 and again for cohorts born from 1955 to 1974. The cohorts that
show the greatest change came of age between 1925 and 1969 and again
since 1980. The rate of change for the more recent cohorts appears to be
faster (over five percentage points per decade) than during the first decline
(about three percentage points per decade) as indicated by the difference
between the loess regression line and the linear trend line.
Deciding whether change over time is the result of historical effects
that spread throughout the population all at once or effects on young
people that last a lifetime is, by its nature, uncertain (e.g., Mason et al.
1973; Duncan and Stenbeck 1988). In the case of mainline decline, we
think that cohort differences are paramount because differential fertility
(the process that produces each cohort) is the prime factor. If our demographic model does a poor job of projecting change in the Protestant
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population, then we will have to change our mind about the primacy of
cohort effects.

ISOLATING THE SOURCES OF DENOMINATIONAL CHANGE

To assess the contributions of differential natural increase and differential
conversion to the trend in mainline Protestant affiliation, we make projections that systematically vary the potential sources of change: the rate
of natural increase (rjt), conversion rates (Cjt ), or apostasy rates (Ajt). In
scenario 1 we use all of the observed data to project change. As these
three variables exhaust the logically possible sources of change, they have
to fit the observed trend well. If they do not fit well, then we will have
to conclude that one of our simplifying assumptions (e.g., that differential
mortality is not a factor) is incorrect and elaborate the demographic model
until an acceptable fit is achieved.
Scenario 2 is the most important projection. In this one, we take natural
increase as the only source of variation over time; conversion and apostasy
constant are set to zero. In scenario 3 we use observed conversions from
mainline to conservative denominations and assign each denomination
the average rate of natural increase and hold other switches constant. In
scenario 4 we use observed conversions from conservative to mainline
and hold natural increase and other switches constant. In scenario 5 we
use all observed switches and hold natural increase constant. Appendix
table A1 gives the details of the conditions that define our five scenarios.

Scenario 1: The Full Model
The model that allows all relevant factors to take their observed values
tracks the change in mainline denominations’ share of the Protestant
population almost perfectly. The observed net change is 22 percentage
points across the cohorts from 1903 to 1973 (using the smoothed series to
remove random variation); scenario 1 not only tracks the change, it overshoots the net change by a single percentage point (or 5%). The correlation
between the smoothed time series shown in figure 3 and our predictions
under scenario 1 is .997. This indicates that our simplifying assumptions
about mortality and the age distribution of fertility are not too inaccurate.

Scenario 2: Natural Increase
The results for scenario 2 are the crucial test for the demographic imperative argument. They show that the lower fertility of mainline Protestants accounts for three-fourths of their declining share of the Protestant
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population of the United States. The demographic model (and its assumption of equal conversions) predicts the changes from 1903 to 1937
with uncanny accuracy (see fig. 4).22 It predicts more change from 1938
to 1951 than we actually observe and then predicts a leveling off among
the cohorts born after 1960 that we do not observe. Overall, though, these
errors are rather small. The correlation between the smoothed and the
predicted percentages is .97. Keep in mind that in this scenario religious
change has but one source: differential fertility. It assumes that the switching back and forth between mainline and conservative denominations
cancels out. Yet the predicted mainline decline is in precise proportion to
actual changes, and the predicted change over cohorts is 76% as large as
the observed change.23
Scenario 3: Conversion from Mainline to Conservative
In scenarios 3–5 we focus on denominational switching, apostasy, and
conversion from non-Protestant religions to the two types of Protestant
denominations. The leading explanations of the declining mainline denominations emphasize the importance of people switching form the mainline denominations to the conservative ones. Scenario 3 is just as crucial
a test of their ideas as scenario 2 was of ours.
We calculate the standard measures of switching, apostasy, and conversion by comparing peoples’ current religion with the one in which they
were raised. Table 1 presents the measures based on Protestant origins.
Slightly more than 80% of Protestants born before 1910 and raised in the
mainline tradition remained mainline as adults (or were back to their
origins by the time they were interviewed), compared with 71% or 72%
of those born after 1940. The proportion remaining within (or returning
to) the conservative tradition has not changed significantly from its average of 77% across all cohorts.
Surprisingly, switching from mainline to conservative denominations
has not changed significantly over 70 cohorts.24 The significant changes
are the rise in the proportion of persons from mainline backgrounds who
profess no religion and the fall in the proportion of conservatives who
22

Among other comparisons that could be made, we note that it does appreciably
better than the same model does in accounting for ethnic identification (Hout and
Goldstein 1994)—a process that should actually be easier to predict as ancestry is more
directly passed from generation-to-generation than religion is and there is no ethnic
equivalent to religious apostasy.
23
If we were to delete the observations based on 25–34 year olds (for reasons explained
above in the section on classifying denominations), we would conclude that fertility
accounts for 93% of the observed change across cohorts.
24
See the italic figures in table 1.
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Fig. 4.—Observed percentage of 25–74-year-old U.S. Protestants professing a mainline
denomination and that predicted by the demographic model by year of birth. Data are from
the GSS, 1973–98, and were smoothed using loess regression (bandwidth p .4). Estimates
take account of sampling design effects.

switch to mainline denominations. There is change in the behavior of
Protestants, but not the kind that many authors assume. Our scenario 3
projection puts these numbers to work to see if the apparent lack of change
translates into the kind of negative evidence we think it does. As figure 5
shows, the small changes over time in conversion from a mainline to a
conservative denomination has no effect on the proportion of the cohort
that is in a mainline denomination. It explains only 4% of the total change,
and the correlation between the smoothed series and the predictions is
actually negative (⫺.23).
Scenario 4: Conservative to Mainline Switching
The falling rate of conversion from conservative to mainline denominations is important (see fig. 6). With all other factors held constant, decreased conservative to mainline switching accounts for 36% of the observed change. The explanatory power of scenario 4 comes at the end of
the time series when the demographic model (scenario 2) predicted a
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TABLE 1
Denominational Switching by Type of Origin Denomination
Current Religious Preference (%)
Type/Year of Birth

Same as Origin

Other Protestant

Other Religion

No Religion

Raised mainline:
1900–9 . . . . . . . . . . . .
1910–19 . . . . . . . . . .
1920–29 . . . . . . . . . .
1930–39 . . . . . . . . . .
1940–49 . . . . . . . . . .
1950–59 . . . . . . . . . .
1960–73 . . . . . . . . . .
Net change . . . .
Raised conservative:
1900–9 . . . . . . . . . . . .
1910–19 . . . . . . . . . .
1920–29 . . . . . . . . . .
1930–39 . . . . . . . . . .
1940–49 . . . . . . . . . .
1950–59 . . . . . . . . . .
1960–73 . . . . . . . . . .
Net change . . . .

81
80
77
74
72
72
71
⫺10
71
75
79
76
76
75
77
79
4

13
13
13
15
13
10
11
⫺2

3
5
5
6
8
7
7
4

3
2
4
5
8
11
12
8

21
16
18
17
14
11
9
⫺12

1
2
3
3
4
4
5
3

2
3
2
4
6
7
7
5

Source.—General Social Survey, 1974–98.
Note.—For all cohorts, preferences total 100%; net change is zero.

slowing of mainline decline. Apparently the mainline denominations continued to lose share after their demographic disadvantage waned because
they were no longer as attractive to persons raised in the conservative
tradition as they once were; that is, recent cohorts of conservatives dramatically slowed their rate of switching to mainline denominations.
The main dynamic here is a decline in the practice of upwardly mobile
conservative Protestants joining a mainline church. Long a mainstay of
American religion, the image of status-securing religious switching (Glock
and Stark 1968) has been out of place for recent cohorts (see Roof and
McKinney 1987; Sherkat and Wilson 1995). The conservative power brokers’ prayer breakfast may well have supplanted the need some once felt
to align their congregational affiliation with their socioeconomic status.
Figure 7 presents some GSS evidence on this point. We define persons as
upwardly mobile if their own highest educational credential exceeds that
of their more-educated parent; they are immobile if they have the same
credential as their more-educated parent.25 Although the single-year data
25

Even though downward mobility occurs, it is rare enough to provide little systematic
evidence. We have fewer than 15 cases of downward mobility per cohort. Comparing
10-year cohorts, we could not reject the null hypothesis of no change for either the
mainline or conservative Protestants.
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Fig. 5.—Observed percentage of 25–74-year-old U.S. Protestants professing a mainline
denomination and that predicted by switching between Protestant denominations by year
of birth. Data are from the GSS, 1973–98, and were smoothed using loess regression (bandwidth p .4). Estimates take account of sampling design effects

are highly variable, the overall trend toward less switching among those
raised in conservative denominations is earlier and of greater magnitude
among the upwardly mobile than among the educationally immobile. The
rate of switching for upwardly mobile Protestants from conservative backgrounds fell from 27% to 11% for the 1925–73 cohorts (about 3.3 percentage points per decade). The trend for educationally immobile persons
of conservative background is unchanged from 1903 to 1945; then it starts
down in concert with the overall trend toward less conversion among
conservatives. Less than 10% of the most recent cohorts have switched
from a conservative to a mainline denomination.
Among persons with mainline backgrounds, the rate of switching to
conservative denominations has been steady at 13% across all cohorts.
Among the upwardly mobile the rate of switching has risen from under
10% in the early cohorts to 15% in the cohorts born between 1935 and
1941; recently it has gone back down to below 10%.
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Fig. 6.—Denominational switching by cohort, religious origin, and educational mobility
for persons 25–74 years old, raised Protestant, and currently Protestant. Data are from the
GSS, 1974–98, and were smothed by loess (bandwidth p .7).

Scenario 5: Switching, Conversion, and Apostasy
All forms of religious change together combine to account for 43% of the
drop in mainline affiliation (scenario 5). Conversion of non-Protestants
actually works against the prevailing trends; as table 2 shows, mainline
denominations held an initial advantage in this process and it has grown
for recent cohorts. Apostasy has been greater for persons raised in mainline
denominations in each cohort, but the gap between mainline and conservative apostates has grown larger in recent cohorts. About two-fifths
of recent apostates have joined the Roman Catholic Church; 60% have
left organized religion. These trends have been rising sharply enough to
offset the growth represented by converts to mainline denominations coming in from other religions or no religion.26 The correlation between the
predictions of scenario 5 and the smoothed series is .97, indicating that,
although this scenario fails to anticipate the magnitude of the mainline
decline (accounting for only 10 percentage points of the 22 percentage

26

This is the explanation that Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens (1994) favor, based on their
analysis of Presbyterians.
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for persons 25–74 years old, raised Protestant, and currently Protestant. Data are from the
GSS, 1974–98, and were smoothed by loess regression (bandwidth p .7).

point change), it does the best of any of the counterfactual models we
have considered in accounting for the precise timing of declines.27
Summary: What We Learned from the Scenarios
Two types of religious switching have changed enough to be of concern
for the mainline denominations. The conservative denominations are
sending fewer people to the mainline denominations than they did 30, 50,
or 70 years ago. Meanwhile mainline Protestants are converting to Catholicism more than they used to, and they are leaving organized religion.
The conjectures about culture wars within mainline denominations advanced by writers such as Hadden (1969), Hunter (1987), and Reeves
(1998) are designed to explain what they assumed was an upswing in
switches from mainline to conservative denominations. Likewise the arguments about the “strength” of conservative denominations are motivated by the observation that they are gaining share in the religious
marketplace (Finke and Stark 1992; Iannaccone 1994). That type of religious mobility turns out to add nothing to mainline decline. Thus most

27

The combination of high correlation and low net change is a reminder that the
correlation between smoothed and predicted series alone is an insufficient gauge of
the accuracy of a simulation model. The net change measure is at least as important.
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TABLE 2
Denominational Switching by Type of Current Denomination
Religious Origin
Type/Year of Birth

Currently mainline:
1900–09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1910–19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1920–29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1930–39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1940–49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1950–59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1960–73 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Net change . . . . . . .
Currently conservative:
1900–09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1910–19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1920–29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1930–39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1940–49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1950–59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1960–73 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Net change . . . . . . .

Same as Current

Other Protestant

Other Religion

No Religion

82
83
77
74
74
75
74
⫺8

14
13
16
17
16
13
12
⫺2

2
3
5
6
7
9
11
9

2
2
2
3
3
2
3
1

78
79
80
79
80
81
80
2

20
17
15
15
13
10
12
⫺7

1
2
3
3
5
7
5
4

1
2
3
3
3
3
3
2

Source.—General Social Survey, 1974–98.
Note.—For all cohorts, categories total 100%; net change is zero.

explanations of mainline decline focus on what is not happening while
saying next to nothing about what is happening.
The close fit between the predictions of the demographic model (scenario 2) and the observed and smoothed data lead us to conclude that
differential fertility is the most important cause of the mainline decline
(see table 3). Those changes are supplemented and abetted by the dropoff in switches from conservative to mainline denominations. Figure 8
brings the significant elements together. It shows the smoothed series, the
predictions of the demographic model, and the predictions of the full
model. These lines are augmented with vertical lines connected to the
predictions of the demographic model. These lines represent the net effect
of switching from conservative to mainline denominations. For cohorts
born before 1960, this form of switching increased the mainline’s share
of Protestants, but for recent cohorts the fall-off in conservative-to-mainline switching has accelerated the mainline decline after the point where
the demographic model predicted it would slow down. Separately trends
in fertility and in switching to the mainline denominations account for
76% and 36% of the observed trend, respectively. In interaction, they
account for exactly 100%.
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TABLE 3
Goodness of Fit Measures for Five Scenarios of Denominational Change
across Cohorts
Scenario

Net change (%):
Smoothed series . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Predicted byscenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ratio of predicted to smoothed . . .
Correlation of predicted %:*
Observed % . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Smoothed % . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

2

3

4

5

22
23
105

22
17
76

22
1
4

22
8
36

22
10
43

.88
.997

.85
.97

⫺.16
⫺.23

.84
.95

.87
.98

Note.—Scenario 1 is the full model; 2 is the demographic model; 3 is the switch from mainline to
conservative; 4 is the switch from conservative to mainline; 5 is switching, apostasy, and conversion.
* The correlation between the observed and smoothed series is .89.

UNDERSTANDING THE CHANGES IN CONSERVATIVES’ BEHAVIOR

The conservative denominations have grown more than the mainline
denominations in large part because they have higher fertility, and that
has given them a growth advantage. But part of conservative growth is
attributable to the recent decrease in conservatives’ rate of switching to
mainline denominations. While the diminished influx has hurt the mainline denominations, it has not necessarily helped the conservative ones.
That is because conservative denominations are losing the same fraction
of their young people as they were losing 30–50 years ago; intergenerational persistence has not increased for conservative denominations. People leaving conservative denominations have just changed their destination after a switch. Conservatives used to switch to mainline
denominations; recently they have chosen other religions (especially Catholicism but also some of the “other” religions) and no religion more often
than they have chosen the mainline denominations. In this section, we
consider some possible explanations for these changes.

Intermarriage
A leading cause of religious switching and conversion in any generation
is the practice of picking a common family religion after a marriage
between people from different religious backgrounds (Greeley 1984). In
recent cohorts, conservatives have decreased cross-denominational marriage to mainline Protestants from 33% to 20% and increased their rates
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Fig. 8.—Percentage of Protestants affiliated with a mainline denomination by year of
birth: observed for U.S. Protestants, 25–74 years old, and predicted from past fertility and
religious switching; smoothing done by loess regression (bandwidth p .5). The vertical lines
show the effect of switching between denominations on the percentage mainline in each
cohort. The gap between the tip of the vertical line and the line representing the percentage
mainline predicted by the full model is the portion of the projection attributable to the
combined effects of apostasy and conversion from non-Protestant religions (or no religion)
to Protestantism.

of marrying Catholics and partners with no religious background.28 These
trends are shown in table 4. The decrease in marriage to mainline Protestants helps explain the decrease in the proportion of conservative Protestants who switch to mainline denominations. Intermarriage with Catholics has increased from 3% of persons born in the years from 1900 to
1909 to 15% of persons born from 1960 to 1973. Not quite as dramatically,
intermarriage with people with no religious background increased from
2% to 5% across cohorts.
Most intermarried conservative Protestants remain conservative Prot28

The change is statistically significant but not monotonic. For the 7 # 6 table of
cohort by spouse’s religious origin for conservative Protestants ages 25–74 years, the
design-corrected test of the null hypothesis of no change is F(19.83, 5690.64) p 1.698,
P p .027; for the 7 # 5 table that deletes the conservative Protestant (i.e., in-married)
column, the design corrected test statistic is F(21.21, 5281.76) p 1.997, P p .004; for
the 7 # 2 table that combines all non-Protestant religions (including no religion)
into a single category, the design-corrected test statistics is F(5.75, 1431.20) p 6.647,
P ! .001.
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TABLE 4
Religious Origin of Spouse for Conservative Protestants
Spouse’s Religious Origin (%)

Year of
Birth

Conservative

Mainline

Catholic

Other

None

1900–9 . . . .
1910–19 . . .
1920–29 . . .
1930–39 . . .
1940–49 . . .
1950–59 . . .
1960–69 . . .
All . . . . . . . . .

61
65
61
62
59
59
58
61

33
24
28
26
26
21
20
25

3
6
8
8
11
13
15
10

1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1

2
3
2
3
2
5
5
3

Note.—For all cohorts, categories total 100%. “None” indicates no religious preference.

estants. In all cohorts, little over 40% of the intermarried have changed
their religion from conservative Protestant to something else. In the cohorts born in the 1950s through 1973, however, the propensity to remain
a conservative Protestant has increased modestly. Thus even though rising
intermarriage with a Catholic is the main source of conversion from conservative Protestant to Catholic, few conservative Protestants make the
change.
Organization and Participation
Perhaps conservatives persist in their affiliation because they are better
organized than mainline Protestants. Supply-side theories emphasize that
religion thrives when denominations compete (Finke and Stark 1992).
They also postulate that demanding religions get more of their members’
attention and hold them better (Iannaccone 1992). One marker of the
extent to which denominations are engaged in the competition for members is their success in organizing members into faith-based clubs and
activities. If the conservatives are better organized than the mainline
denominations, then members of conservative denominations ought to be
more likely to participate in clubs and activities that are affiliated with
a church. From 1974 to 1994 the GSS asked people whether they belonged
to any church-affiliated organizations.
Consistent with expectations, Protestants from conservative denominations are more active in church organizations; 46% of conservatives
compared to 40% of mainliners belong to church-affiliated organizations.29
29

Calculations in this section of the article refer to Protestants who are 25–74 years
old at the time of the GSS. The six-point difference is significant even after adjusting
for design effects (F[1,277] p 20.499, P ! .001).
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The concern is to explain the greater persistent of recent cohorts, of course,
so the participation of Protestants born since 1960 is more relevant than
that of all Protestants. Younger people in conservative denominations
are more active than those in mainline denominations by the same sixpercentage-point margin as found overall. However, even though the level
of activity is greater for conservative denominations, belonging to an
organization does not protect against switching. Among Protestants who
were raised in a conservative denomination, 16% are now in a mainline
denomination whether they have joined a church organization or not. So
while conservative denominations hold an edge in organization, that does
not provide a convincing answer as to why more people raised as conservative Protestants are remaining in that tradition.
Conservative Religious Beliefs
Another argument offered to explain the growth of the conservative denominations stresses the appeal of traditional beliefs. This argument asserts that people with traditional beliefs—such as a literal interpretation
of the Bible and God’s direct intervention in daily affairs—leave the
mainline denominations for conservative ones that place more emphasis
on these ideas as core expressions of Christian faith (Hadden 1969). Another view is that the mainline seminaries teach ecumenism and liberal
views of Christian theology and, thereby, drive a wedge between mainline
clergy and their congregations (Finke and Stark 1992). While these explanations were devised to explain switching from mainline to conservative, they could, conceivably, be useful in crafting an explanation of
the trend toward lower out-switching from conservative to mainline
denominations.
The problem with these explanations is that the cohorts most likely to
stay with the conservative denominations—the people born since
1960—are the least likely to take a literal view of the Bible and are no
more likely than other cohorts to embrace traditional views. Conservative
Protestants born before 1940 are 30% more likely than later cohorts to
take the Bible literally—65% of the pre-1940 conservatives compared with
51% of the conservative Protestants born in the years 1940–73.30 The
post-1960 cohorts are not significantly more likely to believe in an afterlife,
heaven, hell, the devil, or religious miracles; nor are they more likely to
have had a born-again experience or to have tried, as stated by a GSS
questionnaire, “to convince others to accept Jesus Christ as their savior.”

30

There is no difference in this measure between cohorts born in the years 1940–59
and 1960–73.
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These beliefs cannot explain the growing attachment of cohorts to their
denominations of origin because they themselves have not changed.
Conservative Political Beliefs
The leadership of some mainline denominations took liberal stances on
civil rights, the Vietnam War, abortion, women’s rights, immigration, and
gay rights that supposedly alienated a segment of the mainline Protestant
population. According to Reeves (1998), the less liberal laity within those
denominations “reacted with revulsion” to such advocacy and left the
mainline churches for more conservative ones. As we have seen, the data
contradict Reeves and the others before him who made similar arguments.
But perhaps the liberal politics of some mainline leaders is keeping young
people raised in conservative denominations who might convert under
less politicized circumstances from doing so. If politics is part of the falloff in conservative-to-mainline switching, then it should show up as a
growing gap between the political views of those persons who have made
the switch to mainline denominations and those who remain in conservative denominations.
We use three indicators of political views: (1) the number of circumstances—from zero to six—under which the person thinks a pregnant
woman ought to be able to obtain a legal abortion, (2) the support for
sex education in public schools, acceptance of premarital sex, and acceptance of homosexuality (combined into a standardized scale: mean p 0;
SD p 1.0), and (3) self-identification with conservatives on a seven-point
scale. The first two items are high for liberals and low for conservatives;
the last item is high for conservatives and low for liberals. Table 5 shows
that the gap between the people who are still in conservative denominations and those who have switched to a mainline denomination is
shrinking, not growing.
Subculture and Attachment
Christian Smith and colleagues (1998) advanced a theory of subcultural
attachment in order to explain the strength of the pandenominational
evangelical movement in the United States. Woodberry and Smith (1998)
see the subcultural approach as relevant to the debates about mainline
decline and conservative growth. According to Smith et al. (1998) evangelical Christians share a subcultural identity that builds a community
of faith resistant to outside influences. It is particularly well suited to the
pluralistic American context because it draws strength from the distinctiveness of its own approach in contrast to the other important Protestant
traditions—including the mainline tradition. As Woodberry and Smith
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TABLE 5
Political Views of Persons Raised in Conservative Protestant Denominations
by Cohort and Current Religion

Sexual Liberal

Abortion

Political
Identification

Year of
Birth

Conservative

Mainline

Conservative

Mainline

Conservative

Mainline

1900–9 . . . .
1910–19 . . .
1920–29 . . .
1930–39 . . .
1940–49 . . .
1950–59 . . .
1960–73 . . .

3.26
3.17
3.32
3.54
3.57
3.61
3.56

4.02
4.42
4.42
4.26
4.26
4.20
3.72

⫺.81
⫺.61
⫺.43
⫺.27
⫺.09
⫺.03
.04

⫺.93
⫺.29
⫺.24
⫺.07
.13
.15
.01

4.23
4.34
4.45
4.36
4.24
4.21
4.29

4.17
4.43
4.42
4.36
4.22
4.24
4.21

(1998) note, several features of the evangelical tradition (as Smith et al.
[1998] characterize it) might be useful in understanding why conservative
churches are growing or why they are doing a better job of holding on
to the people raised in conservative denominations.
We see three problems in applying the theory of distinctive subcultures
to the trends we have documented here. First, the dynamics behind the
trends are not what Woodberry and Smith assume them to be. Mainline
Protestants are not switching to conservative denominations in greater
numbers; therefore the supposed “attractiveness” of the conservative
churches is not a factor. The subcultural theory could be extended to
account for higher rates of intergenerational persistence within conservative denominations. But that is not happening either. The decrease in
the rate of switching from conservative to mainline denominations is being
offset by increasing rates of conversion from conservative denominations
to other religions and by apostasy. Intergenerational persistence is neither
increasing nor decreasing for conservative denominations.
Second, the original subcultural theory applies to subjective identification with different Protestant traditions but not directly to denominations. The terms of this debate, as set by the literature that preceded our
own study, dictate a focus on denominations. The Smith theory—which
specifies identities that cut across different denominations—goes about
trying to explain something other than denominational attachments. They
are somewhat related, but less so than one might assume. Only a minority
of persons in conservative denominations, even in the 1990s, are evangelicals, according to Smith et al. (1998, p. 241).
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Conclusions Regarding Conservatives’ Behavior
The only aspect of conservatives’ behavior that helps explain the fall-off
in the rate at which they switch to mainline denominations is intermarriage. We have considered each of the leading explanations in turn and
found that the data contradict some part of each of them. Conservatives’
organizational attachments are no protection against defection; conservatives who switch to mainline denominations become active in their new
denomination (more so than persons raised mainline). Recent cohorts of
conservative Protestants are more religiously and politically liberal than
older cohorts are. The mismatch between identities and denominations
makes it impossible to apply the insights of subculture perspective to
explaining denominational trends.

CONCLUSION

The changing shape of U.S. Protestantism reflects the interaction of differential demography and strong socialization. There are more conservatives today because their parents had larger families than did Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Methodist, Lutheran, and Congregationalist
parents. The conservatives’ demographic advantage is abetted in recent
cohorts by a fall-off in conversions from conservative to mainline denominations. Most alternative explanations turn out to be incorrect because
they assume facts that are not in evidence in order to explain mainline
decline or conservative growth. In particular, most observers who offered
an explanation for mainline decline asserted that Protestants were switching from mainline to conservative denominations at a faster pace in the
1970s and 1980s than they had in the 1950s and 1960s. They were wrong.
Cohorts show no trend and only slight variation in the rate of switching
from mainline to conservative denominations. The variations are so slight
that mainline-to-conservative switching makes no contribution at all to
mainline decline or conservative growth.
The explanation for the changing shape of U.S. Protestantism is, therefore, demographic, not ideological. The sociology of religion has long
known that the surest source of new members for any denomination is
the children of today’s membership (e.g., Greeley 1969). The conservatives
had the advantage there because, for the first half of the 20th century,
conservative families were having more children than the members of the
mainline denominations were. Mainline denominations closed the fertility
gap somewhat during the baby boom then fell behind again after the
boom reached its peak. By the time the mainline fertility stopped falling
and conservative fertility closed the gap again in the 1980s, the seeds of
demographic reversal were sown.
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The demographic momentum subsided in the most recent cohorts. But
just as it did, conservative denominations developed a socialization advantage. Persons raised in conservative denominations in the 1980s are
half as likely to switch to a mainline denomination as previous conservative cohorts had been. The trend toward staying in conservative denominations is strongest among the rising numbers of upwardly mobile
conservatives.
Predicting the future is precarious at best, but our evidence suggests
that the trends underlying mainline decline may be nearing their end.
The demographic momentum, as it affects cohorts, is spent.31 Unless conservative Protestants increase their family size or mainline Protestants
further reduce theirs, this contributor to mainline decline will not be a
factor in the future. And the other key predictor—the falling rate of
switching from conservative to mainline denominations—is reaching an
end point of its own. Having fallen from 21% to 9%, the conservativeto-mainline switching rate cannot continue falling much longer simply
because it cannot drop below zero. Exhaust both sources of change and
change will stop unless and until a third source comes along.
A word of caution is in order, though. We focused on cohorts because
the behavioral changes show themselves most clearly in the succession of
cohorts. But we live in real time. The cross-section of Protestants in any
particular year for the next half century or more will still include the
people born during times of differential fertility. The demographic momentum of differential fertility will remain present in the cross-section
until the cohorts born in the early 1970s (the last ones in which conservatives held a substantial fertility advantage) pass away—and they are
just turning 30 years old in the early years of the first decade of the 21st
century. So the Protestant population will continue to shift in the conservative direction for many years to come, even if no further changes in
underlying behaviors occur.
This research is good news for both mainline and conservative churches.
The mainline clergy need not feel responsible for their denominations’
slippage so long as the main source of change is the fertility decisions of
Protestant families. Meanwhile, conservative clergy and laity can feel
gratified that their most recent growth has little or no ideological content;
its source is the greater number of young people raised in their tradition.

31

Our model that relies on demography only—scenario 2—predicts less than 1% decline
in the proportion of Protestants who belong to mainline denominations over the next
decade.
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APPENDIX

TABLE A1
Conditions Applied to the Parameters of the Denominational
Growth Model to Produce Five Simulations
Simulation Scenario
Parameter

1

2

3

4

5

r1t . . . . . . . . .
r2t . . . . . . . . .
C1t . . . . . . . .
C2t . . . . . . . .
A1t . . . . . . . .
A2t . . . . . . . .

V
V
V
V
V
V

V
V
0
0
0
0

r̄t
r̄t

r̄t
r̄t
C̄1

r̄t
r̄t

V
C̄2
Ā1
Ā2

V
Ā1
Ā2

V
V
V
V

Note.—The first subscript refers to denomination type (1 p mainline, 2 p conservative);
the second subscript refers to cohort (t p 1900, . . . , 1973); V p observed variation; r̄t rate
of natural increase for cohort t averaged across denominational types; C̄j p conversion rate
for denominational type j averaged across cohorts; and Āj p apostasy rate for denominational
type j averaged across cohorts.
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